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Introduction
Intelligence embodied in inanimate matter is not a new idea. Many 
creation myths, including those in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
involve divine power that grants intelligence to clay and mud. It is 
also not a particularly new idea that people may, through magic or 
science, embody intelligence in inanimate matter themselves. This 
idea is often presented as part of a warning about the dangers of 
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technology: there are the golem of Jewish folklore, Mary Shelly’s 
Frankenstein, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, the Terminator movies, and 
numerous other science-fi ction novels, movies, comic books, and so 
on, with a similar theme. What is relatively new in this narrative is 
we now have the means to embody what may pass for intelligence 
in otherwise inanimate matter with the help of artifi cial intelligence 
(AI) research.
Military applications of this research in sophisticated lethal 
autonomous weapon systems (AWS) have been particularly visible 
in recent popular media, scholarship, and even policy debates. 
Autonomous devices that can kill people are not a completely new 
technology. Traps, mines, self-directing projectiles, and missiles 
that can select and engage on their own have all been used in 
warfare. However, there are scholars that would disagree with this 
application of “autonomous” and urge that such weapons are merely 
semi-autonomous2. AWS coupled with AI may present a special sort 
of autonomy that comes with their ability to reason and learn in 
a way that is qualitatively similar to the way that humans reason 
and learn. Still, it remains unclear what a claim about autonomy 
in AWS amounts to beyond their ability to select, target, and fi re 
a weapon. “Autonomy” is either a legal or philosophical term of art, 
meant to capture something about complex human behaviour in 
the context of some domain-specifi c theory. How to operationalise 
human autonomy is controversial, which means there are no settled 
criteria to reference to verify whether a computer system or even in 
a non-human animal is autonomous. 
For the purpose of this article, AWS are defi ned as computer 
systems that select, target, and engage targets without human 
control, and can eventually become replacements for humans 
in the battlefi eld. The main assumption of this defi nition is that 
satisfying both criteria can at the present time be done only with 
the help of sophisticated AI, including, but not limited to symbolic 
2 H.M. Roff and D. Danks: Trust but Verify: The diffi culty of trusting autonomous weapons 
systems, „Journal of Military Ethics” 2018, t. 17, nr 1, s. 3.
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systems and machine learning. Among these systems we can count 
autonomous drones, autonomous tanks, autonomous submarines, 
and other autonomous mobile systems that can function without 
any guidance from human operators but can behave as if they had 
human operators. 
What is different about this category of AWS compared to other 
autonomous weapons, such as missiles, mines, and so on, is the 
potential precision and lethality with which they can autonomously 
(in a weak sense) select and engage without human supervision. With 
a few exceptions that will be discussed later, no other technologies 
have been able to achieve that kind of autonomy coupled with that 
level of precision and lethality. As the cost of their development and 
deployment decreases, such systems become natural candidates 
for replacing human soldiers. This presents a qualitative difference 
from other autonomous weapons, such as mines and missiles, which 
cannot play that role. Given this, the remainder of this paper does 
not consider (weakly) autonomous weapons such as autonomous 
stationary gun turrets, missile defence systems, and any type of 
lingering munitions, such as mines, autonomous missiles, and 
traps to be its subject. These weapons are not autonomous in the 
relevant sense. Furthermore, the issue of the ontological category 
for AWS, as autonomous in the sense of being able to reason or 
learn, is not addressed here at all.
Many dangerous weapons, such as anti-infantry mines, fl echette 
bombs, or biological weapons, have been banned or restricted by 
international treaties. Special sessions of the United Nations on 
AWS resulted in debate, but no outright rejections, limits, or bans. 
It is not diffi cult to fi nd reasons why AWS have not been banned. 
AWS offer many political, tactical, and strategic benefi ts at little 
apparent cost. First, targeting in AWS is likely to be more accurate, 
more effective, and their performance on the battlefi eld would likely 
outmatch that of their human adversaries. Second, AWS are not 
people. This means that AWS are not infl uenced by stress, fatigue, 
or pain; they will not intentionally kill civilians; they will not disobey 
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orders; and they will not come home from war with post-traumatic 
stress disorder, physical injury, or die in battle. Consequently, 
one may argue, AWS will likely limit or eliminate many political 
and social problems associated with war, all while delivering an 
unprecedented level of military force. 
The aim of this paper is to make the case that a future world with 
AWS is more likely to be closer to the grim scenarios from popular 
science fi ction than to the rosy picture of wars fought by virtuous 
machine soldiers. The key step in the argument to that conclusion 
are predictions about AWS being taken over with electronic and/or 
programming means, in other words, being hacked. Such predictions 
are typically thought to channel fears that drove all the myths about 
intelligence embodied in matter. One of these is the idea that the 
technology can get out of control and ultimately lead to horrifi c 
consequences, as is the case in Mary Shelley’s classic Frankenstein. 
Given this, predictions about killer robots are sometimes dismissed 
as science-fi ction fear-mongering. On the other hands, unlike 
Frankenstein AWS are not a myth but matters of fact, so the fears 
that they give rise to should be taken seriously. Myths about 
technology running amok can also be helpful in generating possible 
scenarios where AWS run amok by being hacked.
The next section of the paper defends the idea that an assessment 
of the likely consequences of AWS being hacked in the near future 
can be made by making well-motivated analogies to other weapons 
systems. The paper proceeds by considering several such analogies 
and ultimately offers an argument that nuclear weapons and their 
effect on the development of modern asymmetrical warfare are the 
best analogy to the introduction of AWS. The fi nal section focuses on 
this analogy and offers speculations about the likely consequences 
of AWS being hacked. These speculations tacitly draw on myths 
and tropes about technology and AI from popular fi ction, such as 
Frankenstein, to project a convincing model of the risks and benefi ts 
of AWS deployment.
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Hacked AWS
Should we welcome ever more sophisticated autonomous 
weapon systems (AWS) into the armed forces? Ronald Arkin, who 
has been pioneering ethical military robotics for decades, is among 
those that have said “yes”3. There are good reasons supporting this 
answer. As already mentioned, AWS are not infl uenced by stress, 
fatigue, or pain; they will not intentionally kill civilians; they will not 
disobey orders; and they will not come home from war with post-
-traumatic stress disorder. Some scholars even argue that they are 
the best way forward in eliminating human involvement in war4. If 
all this is right, deploying AWS is not only morally permissible, but 
perhaps also morally imperative. Their introduction will lessen the 
morally abhorrent consequences of war. This is perhaps also why it 
is diffi cult to convince policy makers to ban them.
While AWS could potentially replace human soldiers in the fi eld 
and do a better job at soldiering, they also introduce risks that 
undermine any moral imperative or moral permissibility to deploy 
them. But the idea of virtuous AWS comes with a trade-off. In order 
to be sophisticated enough to be better than soldiers, AWS will have 
to be so complex that they will be hack-able5. Software complexity 
inevitably leads to bugs, that is, errors in the logic of a program that 
typically manifest themselves only in very specifi c circumstances. 
Bugs, on the other hand, are inherent vulnerabilities that a hacker 
or a hacker team look to exploit. Unfortunately, there is no perfect 
certainty that bugs and with them affordances for hacking can be 
eliminated in complex software. This creates a situation in which we 
can be certain that the extremely complex software that is likely to 
operate AWS will simultaneously make them eminently hack-able. 
3 R.C. Arkin: The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, „Journal of Military 
Ethics” 2010, t. 9, nr 4, s. 334.
4 S. Umbrello, P. Torres, and A.F. De Bellis: The future of war: could lethal autonomous 
weapons make confl ict more ethical? „AI & Society” 2019, s. 2.
5 M. Klincewicz: Autonomous Weapon Systems, The Frame Problem, and Computer Security, 
„Journal of Military Ethics” 2015, t. 14, nr 2, s. 169.
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What is not clear, however, is that hacked AWS present a serious 
problem.
The fi rst way to undermine the claim that hacked AWS are indeed 
problematic is to point out that it assumes that consequences 
are the relevant measure of what makes something permissible 
or imperative. A nonconsequentialist moral theorist would likely 
disagree with this approach. This is not in itself a fatal objection, 
since consequentialism can be defended, but it may weaken worries 
about hacked AWS, since it shows them to be hostage to a particular 
normative theory being true. 
This objection can be overcome in two ways. The fi rst is to deny 
that the notion of the consequences responsible for worries about 
hacked AWS is the same as the one at work in consequentialist 
normative theories. For these theories, the kind of consequences 
that matter are amounts of pleasure or harm, satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, or simply utility. If we interpret “consequences” 
as whatever consequences that may be, but need not be, morally 
relevant, then we remain neutral about normative theory. Non-
-consequentialist theories espouse this wider notion of consequence, 
too. 
The second and related way to resist this objection is to point 
out that the reason why it is presumably permissible or perhaps 
even imperative to deploy AWS in battle is an elimination of certain 
kinds of consequences of battle and war involving human soldiers. 
AWS will not act outside the chain of command, will not get post-
-traumatic stress, etc., so, the argument goes, their deployment will 
eliminate sources of harm/dissatisfaction/loss of utility that are 
consequences of deploying human soldiers. If what matters to the 
permissibility of AWS deployment is some calculus of consequences, 
then what matters in undermining the permissibility of AWS 
deployment should also be such a calculus. It has to be shown that 
consequences of AWS deployment are in some relevant way more 
problematic than those associated with human soldiers. Hacking 
is on its own not necessarily problematic and, furthermore, human 
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soldiers can also be hacked, metaphorically speaking, by religions, 
ideologies, and brainwashing. 
It is not at all clear how we could argue with any degree of 
confi dence that hacked AWS will lead to consequences that are more 
problematic than those that may be caused by human soldiers. One 
reason to believe that we cannot assess the risks posed by AWS 
deployment comes from their technological novelty. Speculations 
about risk typically involve predictions based on past performance. 
Past performance licences probabilistic inferences that can use 
more or less sophisticated mathematical methods to give a measure 
of risk. This option is not available for AWS deployment, because 
there is not enough data about their performance to form reliable 
probabilistic inferences. AWS are too novel technologically. So, what 
we are left with is uncertainty, not risk.
This puts pressure on the claim that we can ever come to 
a reasonably justifi ed conclusion regarding the use of AWS and 
their potential risks. We may be in an epistemic situation not unlike 
people in the 19th century at the precipice of electricity in the home6. 
At that time, doomsday scenarios based on accidents were common. 
As we know, electricity in the home led to signifi cant improvements 
instead. To avoid repeating such an error with AWS, we may want to 
refrain from drawing far-reaching conclusions about their positive 
or negative impact on society.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that today 
we are in a signifi cantly better epistemic situation with respect to 
AWS than people in the 19th century with respect to electricity in the 
home. We are not in a complete state of uncertainty when it comes 
to AWS. Just as we can look to the impact of the landline telephone 
to speculate about the impact of mobile phones7, we can fi nd an 
appropriate basis for speculation about the impact of AWS by 
6 G. Gooday: Domesticating Electricity. Technology, Uncertainty and Gender, 1880–1914. 
Routledge, London 2015.
7 A. Lasen: History Repeating? A Comparison of the Launch and Uses of Fixed and Mobile 
Phones, w: L. Hamill, A. Lasen (red.): Mobile World. Past, Present and Future, Springer, 
London 2005, s. 30.
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looking at the impact of similar weapons. The social and moral risks 
associated with the introduction of new kinds of weapons can be 
successfully assessed and compared with analogies to suffi ciently 
similar devices introduced in the past. 
There are different forms of analogical reasoning, but its basic 
structure is well understood. Analogical reasoning is a type of 
inference that depends on a shared set of elements that belong to 
both the source domain (S) and the target domain (T). For example, 
take an object F, with property p and another object G. If G is 
suffi ciently like F, in that (S) and (T) overlap, then this can be the 
basis of the following line of reasoning:
1) F is p (S)
2) G is like F (T)
3) So, F is q (where q is a property of G)
Analogical arguments can be used as probabilistic sources 
of justifi cation, if the elements in common between S and T are 
relevant. For example, if we know that seas are salty then we can 
conclude by analogy that oceans are similarly salty. The key to the 
inference is the amount of relevantly similar characteristics of seas 
and oceans, so in domains (S) and (T).
Strong analogical arguments allow probabilistic conclusions 
about novel cases based on knowledge we already have. In the case 
of making predictions about the future consequences of deploying 
new weapon technologies, (T) may include a selection of relevantly 
similar weapons introduced in the past that we know about. Based 
on that, we may obtain strong analogies to the weapon under 
consideration – in our case AWS – and then make some probabilistic 
inferences. This can yield an analysis of risk beyond uncertainties.
Assessment using analogies
One place to start looking for the relevant properties for (T) may 
be in technologies that radically changed the nature of war. The fi rst 
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such example is the crossbow8. Predictions regarding the crossbow, 
which rendered most armour at the time useless, included an 
end to all wars and we know how that turned out, so not just any 
historically important weapon would do. 
A better analogy then may be the machine gun. Its use during 
World War I, which occurred at a time when offensives were thought 
to give one a tactical advantage, resulted in massive casualties and 
limited the use of cavalry and concentrated infantry formations9. 
The consequence of its mass introduction was the invention of 
a new way of fi ghting a land war. 
The possibility of massive casualties in pitched battles is unlikely 
to play out with the introduction of AWS. The dramatic consequences 
of introducing machine guns were at least in part the result of the 
anachronistic military tactics of the time, which actually projected 
high levels of casualties, just not that high. The tactics used in the 
19th century or at the beginning of World War I are out of place 
on the contemporary battlefi eld. Soldiers do not assault fortifi ed 
trenches in large numbers, running into machine gun fi re. Given 
this context, it is highly unlikely that any major human force will 
engage in all-out battles with AWS. The relevantly similar historically 
introduced weapon for (T) cannot be the machine gun.
The fact that AWS technology can deliver violence at a distance 
makes it similar to crossbows or machine guns. But there are 
several other properties that make AWS qualitatively different from 
them. Most importantly, AWS can deliver a great deal of lethal 
force without any direct threat to their user. The only historically 
introduced autonomous weapon that is similarly lethal at a distance 
is the nuclear fi ssion device coupled with a delivery system, such 
as a ballistic missile. Analysis of the risks of AWS deployment could 
therefore be based on an analogy with them. 
8 B. Brodie, F.M. Brodie: From Crossbow to H-bomb, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
1973, p. 37.
9 S. Van Evera: The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War, „International 
Security” 1984, t. 9, nr 1, s. 59.
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The introduction of nuclear weapons with delivery systems to 
military arsenals eventually led to the doctrine of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD). MAD has two principles: 1) ensure that 
a response to a nuclear attack is overwhelming and 2) ensure that 
a response to a nuclear attack focuses on population centres as 
well as military installations or only on population centres. These 
principles are either explicitly or implicitly a part of the nuclear 
military doctrines of the United States, Russia, and France. MAD 
was a radical departure from typical war strategy since it projects 
a confrontation with potentially catastrophic consequences for all of 
life on earth, not just belligerents in a confl ict. The main motivation 
for this apocalyptic approach is deterrence of a nuclear fi rst strike10. 
This deterrence is potent because the negative consequences of 
a nuclear war far outweigh the benefi ts anyone may hope to gain 
by starting it. 
Whatever we may think of that logic, MAD contributed to half 
a century of relative peace where no major nuclear power went to war 
with another. This suggests that a similar prediction is warranted 
about the introduction of AWS technology. We can express this 
prediction in an analogical argument with the following form:
4. AWS are very lethal at a distance (S) 
5. Nuclear weapons are very lethal at a distance and their 
introduction resulted in the MAD strategic doctrine (T)
6. So, the introduction of AWS will likely result in a MAD-like 
strategic doctrine
If armies of the world possess large amounts of AWS in the future, 
then indeed a possible long-term outcome may be more peace and 
stability, supported by something like the doctrine of MAD.
However, this analogy to MAD still fails to hit the mark. 
Deployment of AWS technology is not likely to be so catastrophic 
as to destroy life on earth. So, even if the development of AWS 
results in a MAD-like strategic doctrine, this would be for different 
10 C.W. Morris: A Contractarian Defense of Nuclear Deterrence, „Ethics” 1985, t. 95, nr 3, 
s. 484.
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reasons than those that drove the Cold War-era powers to a stand-
-off. In addition, 4–6 falls short of supporting the claim that AWS 
will be more problematic than human soldiers. In fact, what it 
demonstrates is that the list of possible positive outcomes of AWS 
deployment could be supplemented with a prediction of more peace 
and stability. 
Even if we accept the analogy contained in 4–6, there are other 
historically well-known consequences that followed from MAD, 
which lead us directly to a much better analysis. To get to it, we 
need to focus on how war was waged by nuclear powers during the 
Cold War and since then. First, typical post-MAD military confl icts 
did not involve major nuclear powers directly, but indirectly, via 
proxy-wars. Proxy-wars involved third-parties that had tacit or 
explicit fi nancial, political, and military support from the major 
powers, which could thereby compete against each other by proxy, 
without the direct danger of nuclear engagement11. Secondly, if 
nuclear powers engaged in direct combat at all, they usually did 
so with opponents of disproportionately less military capability and 
strength. In short, major military powers of the MAD era engaged 
mostly in asymmetrical wars, such as those in Vietnam and in 
Afghanistan12. 
The most relevant feature of asymmetrical warfare is the way in 
which it is typically carried out by the asymmetric adversary: 
[The asymmetric adversary] will often conduct strikes at the lower, tactical 
level in the hope that they can produce enormous impact at the much 
higher, strategic level: bombs at one point designed to engineer a change of 
government policy at another, a hacker attack on one computer designed 
to shut down a whole economy, the downing of one aircraft to stop a whole 
bombing campaign, the disabling of one warship to stop a whole armada, 
11 E. Melander et al.: Are ‘New Wars’ More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and 
Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War, „European Journal of International 
Relations” 2009, t. 15, nr 3, s. 508, 531.
12 M.N. Schmitt: Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, w: W. Heintschel 
von Heinegg, V. Epping (red.): International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges, 
Springer, Berlin 2007, s. 2.
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the killing of a few troops to engineer a general ‘pull-out’, and the dragging 
out of wars so that interest in outcomes and the will to win are lost13.
Small-scale tactical strikes that have big-scale strategic 
consequences are a part of every confl ict. What is special about 
them in the context of asymmetrical warfare is that they are the 
main and sometimes only strategy for the asymmetrical adversary 
to take. Asymmetrical tactics have become the preferred tactics of 
non-state actors but have also been adopted as an option for states, 
an example being the recent Russian involvement in Ukraine.
Perhaps the best-known successful use of asymmetrical tactics 
are the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th 
200114. In that attack, a group of highly motivated terrorists 
hijacked four commercial airplanes and crashed three of them into 
strategically important sites: the World Trade Center in New York 
City and the Pentagon building in Washington, DC. The remaining 
plane crashed in a fi eld in Pennsylvania during an attempt by 
passengers to regain control of the plane. Subsequently, the United 
States engaged in long and costly wars that, some argue, achieved 
many of the strategic aims that the perpetrators of those attacks 
were aiming to achieve15. 
The weapon of choice for the modern asymmetric adversary is 
an inexpensive solution that leverages the inherent weaknesses of 
complex systems. Hijacking a plane, kidnapping a journalist, or, 
as Thornton suggests, hacking a strategically important computer 
system. This last possibility of hacking is particularly important in 
the context of AWS given the inherent complexity of their software. 
This complexity along with the need to maintain communication 
with AWS during a mission makes them eminently hack-able. AWS 
hacking can be characterised as a small-scale tactical strike with 
the potential for big-scale strategic consequences.
13 R. Thornton: Asymmetric Warfare. Threat and Response in the 21st Century, Polity, 
Cambridge UK 2007, s. 22.
14 I am grateful to Sven Nyholm for suggesting this example to me.
15 B.H. Fishman: The Master Plan. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory, 
Yale University Press, New Haven 2016, s. 64.
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To sum up, modern confl icts create conditions in which tactics 
adopted from asymmetrical warfare will inevitably exploit the sort 
of vulnerabilities that AWS happen to possess. These conditions 
are an indirect result of the introduction massive nuclear arsenals 
and the MAD doctrines. Support for the claim that hacked AWS will 
introduce affordances for consequences that are more problematic 
than whatever human soldiers do comes from the very nature 
of asymmetrical tactics, which aim at maximal strategic impact. 
Any AWS deployed will present an ideal opportunity for a tactical 
hacking strike with high impact strategic consequences. 
The remaining issue is whether such consequences would indeed 
have signifi cant strategic import and, with it, morally abhorrent 
consequences. To demonstrate this some speculation needs to 
happen about what an asymmetrical adversary or an adversary 
that relies on tactics adopted from asymmetrical warfare may want 
to do with a hacked AWS to achieve strategic success. The myths 
and stories of intelligent machines running amok are a particularly 
fruitful source of material for such speculation.
Consequences of hacked AWS
a) Hacked AWS unleashed on a civilian population. Imagine 
a scenario in which AWS are hacked while not yet deployed, perhaps 
in a barracks or at a base, and then made to fi re indiscriminately 
on a defenceless civilian population outside the confl ict zone. The 
terror caused by the situation would count as a tactical victory, 
but also as a strategic success. An indiscriminate attack of killer 
robots on an unsuspecting civilian population would be treated in 
the media as a harbinger of science-fi ction terminators and would 
receive massive news coverage. Its likely consequence would be 
international condemnation and public outrage and likely success 
at the strategic level. 
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b) Hacked AWS unleashed on a military installation. Imagine 
a scenario in which AWS are hacked during deployment and then 
made to fi re on friendly units or destroy their base of operation, 
including infrastructure. This would greatly undermine the morale 
of the human force and damage whatever trust human soldiers 
may have had in AWS technology, with all the possible negative 
consequences that that would have on future tactical-level 
engagements. The consequence is likely success at the strategic 
level. 
c) Hacked AWS unleashed in false-fl ag attacks. Imagine a scenario 
in which AWS are hacked and made to attack a civilian population 
within a confl ict zone, perhaps during a time in which a campaign 
to win “hearts and minds” is under way. The backlash among the 
civilian population and media coverage of such an attack would 
likely paint it as a war crime. In defence, the owner of an AWS would 
have to argue convincingly that they are, in fact, not responsible for 
the tragedy and that it was due to a hacker. Whatever happens in 
that regard, this would likely end up being a high impact event at 
the strategic level.
d) Hacked AWS used as a weapon of terror. Imagine a scenario 
in which AWS are hacked and not used to attack immediately, but 
the possibility of having them attack is communicated through 
mass media, maybe with concrete demands of tactical signifi cance. 
A situation in which AWS could be unleashed on civilians would 
not only bring the kind of media attention that terrorists aim 
for, but would likely result in general distrust of AWS. Again, the 
consequence is likely success at the strategic level.
None of the risks presented in these speculations are present in 
the same scale, if at all, with human soldiers or with weapons under 
total human control. Even “hacked” human soldiers do not present 
the same level of potential lethality and media coverage as hacked 
AWS. AWS add a level of potential lethality and media visibility 
that may not be possible with any other asymmetrical strike. Given 
this, asymmetric adversaries as well as state actors that deploy 
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asymmetric tactics will do their best to exploit AWS for maximum 
media coverage and carnage. This very affordance is the main 
reason why we should expect deployment and eventual hacking of 
AWS to lead to morally abhorrent consequences that far surpass 
those that may be caused by human soldiers. Maximally morally 
abhorrent consequences are what the people that eventually hack 
AWS will aim for.
e) Another likely consequence of hacked AWS is the uncontrolled 
acquisition and proliferation of AWS technology to parties that would 
use them to their own ends. This would mean that regimes that 
oppress and non-state actors that do not care about human rights 
would have a new way to deliver unprecedented levels of violence 
at the press of a button. AWS will not refuse to fi re on civilians 
or protestors. Given this likely outcome of AWS proliferation, the 
dystopian scenario of a human rebellion against terminator robots 
would likely take the form of a struggle between a beleaguered 
population and a human tyrant that controls AWS. In this context 
the hackability of AWS may be a welcome consequence, as it is 
likely to be the only way to even the odds against an oppressive 
regime. In any other case, however, the hackability of AWS presents 
affordances for disaster, as outlined in a)–d). 
Given the high cost of research and development in AI and 
robotics, there is some hope that AWS could be made diffi cult to 
acquire. Regardless, scenario e) will inevitably come to be a reality 
sooner or later as the technologies that are at the heart of lethal AWS 
will become cheaper and more accessible. The only instruments that 
could prevent this are international treaties like those that govern 
the use and sale of weapons of mass destruction and land mines, 
so the very instruments that have so far failed to deliver bans and 
controls on AWS technology. In addition to preventing the spread of 
lethal AWS technologies to states that may use them against their 
populations, such treaties would have a preventative function in 
helping democratic and free states avoid scenarios a)–d).
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In sum, AWS are not infl uenced by stress, fatigue or pain, 
which are all bad consequences for human soldiers. AWS will also 
not intentionally kill civilians, which is certainly a way to avoid 
a morally abhorrent consequence. AWS will also not come home 
from war with post-traumatic stress disorder and they will not 
disobey orders. We can also imagine them becoming more ethical 
on the battlefi eld than humans could ever be. On the other hand, 
AWS can be the opposite of all these good things by being hacked. 
The grim scenarios a)–d) listed above are a potent counterweight to 
whatever positives AWS bring to the battlefi eld. In conclusion, the 
risks presented by AWS are far more morally abhorrent than those 
presented by human soldiers. 
We can predict that AWS will be able to select targets and engage 
them with greater accuracy using whatever weapons are at the 
disposal of human soldiers. But they don’t have to be discriminate, 
if that is not the aim of their deployment. AWS can and will be 
deployed to carry out atrocities. This likely abhorrent consequence 
is exacerbated by the tactical advantages that AWS bring to the 
fi eld. AWS can function in conditions that human soldiers would 
fi nd diffi cult or impossible, such as in space, underwater, in 
environments with high levels of radiation or those affected by 
chemical or biological agents. AWS will also be able to use technology 
that is currently unusable by human soldiers without concern for 
their own survival. Most importantly, AWS will be able to do all 
this on their own, with human guidance only being optional, and 
potentially with a mere press of the button. 
If the analogy to asymmetrical tactics is strong, the vulnerability 
of AWS to hacking will inevitably lead to unprecedented levels of 
abhorrent consequences. We can assess these potential moral risks 
and confi dently conclude that they far outweigh those presented 
by human soldiers. In consequence, it is not morally permissible 
to deploy them. Human soldiers, whatever their foibles, are morally 
better at war than weaponised artifi cial intelligence embodied in 
robots. The main reason for that is human soldiers cannot, at the 
195
Autonomous weapon systems, asymmetrical warfare, and myths
present time, be hacked except metaphorically and that human 
soldiers can refuse to follow an illegal order. 
Abstract
Predictions about autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are typically 
thought to channel fears that drove all the myths about intelligence 
embodied in matter. One of these is the idea that the technology can 
get out of control and ultimately lead to horrifi c consequences, as is 
the case in Mary Shelley’s classic Frankenstein. Given this, predictions 
about AWS are sometimes dismissed as science-fi ction fear-mongering. 
This paper considers several analogies between AWS and other weapon 
systems and ultimately offers an argument that nuclear weapons and 
their effect on the development of modern asymmetrical warfare are the 
best analogy to the introduction of AWS. The fi nal section focuses on this 
analogy and offers speculations about the likely consequences of AWS 
being hacked. These speculations tacitly draw on myths and tropes about 
technology and AI from popular fi ction, such as Frankenstein, to project 
a convincing model of the risks and benefi ts of AWS deployment.
Keywords: ethics of artifi cial intelligence, autonomous weapon systems, war, 
asymmetrical warfare, hacking.
